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Democracy and Constitutionalism 
The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the 
Critique of Ideology. By Susan Marks. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. Pp. 164. Price: $49.99 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Evan 
Criddle. 
In the wake of revolutionary changes in the political landscape of 
Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe over the last three 
decades, some legal scholars have argued that international law has outgrown 
its traditional ideological neutrality. No longer should international law simply 
preserve peace through impartial Cold-War-style balancing. Instead, these 
scholars argue that international law must lay the foundation for a more secure 
and lasting peace by recognizing and fostering the emergence of a universal 
"right to democratic governance." In The Riddle of Constitutions: 
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology, Susan Marks 
uses a critique of ideology to deconstruct popular formulations of this 
"'democratic norm' thesis" (p. 2). Marks's critique offers a penetrating 
analysis of the ways in which acceptance of a "democratic norm" actually 
stabilizes and perpetuates relations of domination, rather than promoting self-
rule and political equality, as its proponents maintain. 
According to Marks, acceptance of the "democratic norm" in 
international law would have tremendous consequences for national 
governments. For example, a democratic norm in international law would 
suggest that national governments derive legitimacy from internationally 
specified criteria. Only governments founded upon democratic principles 
would meet the standard set by these criteria. Marks admits, of course, that 
this position is vulnerable to attack on a number of fronts. First of all, the 
assessment that a democratic norm of governance is emerging is far from 
clear, especially outside of the Western world. Hence, forcing pro-democratic 
bias upon international law may represent a threat of neoimperialism. Second, 
even if a principle of "democracy" merits transnational application, narrow 
application of the "democratic norm thesis" might promote structural change 
in ways that would limit rather than expand democratic participation in 
decision-making processes. 
Marks focuses her critique on the question of how this limitation on 
participation would come about. According to Marks, movements toward 
democracy often focus on "low-intensity democracy": reforming a limited set 
of structures and procedures while leaving deeper power centers 
fundamentally intact. Thus, restructuring of certain national political 
institutions will not deliver meaningful democratic reform as long as 
necessarily related objectives such as human rights, social justice, and civilian 
control of the military remain untouched. The institution of free and fair 
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elections will have little impact on common citizens while social and 
economic inequalities consolidate political power in the hands of only a few. 
Nominally democratic political structures will inevitably fail without the 
tempering influence of a vibrant public sphere where public policy may be 
molded, evaluated, and challenged. 
Extending her analysis, Marks argues that the impact of "low-intensity 
democracy" upon a single nation can only be understood within a 
transnational context. As democracy spreads, it expands the boundaries of 
global markets and provides participants in these markets with greater access 
to resources as barriers to transnational capital flows dissolve. While newly 
liberalized economies may benefit from an influx of foreign investment and 
expanded markets for their own goods, they also fall under the economic and 
political hegemony of dominant Western states. In this way, fostering "low-
intensity democracy" may entrench an uneven distribution of global power 
and resources. In addition, new access to transnational markets inevitably 
exacerbates uneven power-distributions within the new democracies 
themselves. With this socio-economic polarization comes increased social 
tension, which in tum provokes the political marginalization of subordinate 
classes. Thus, "low intensity democracy" inevitably self-destructs as the 
economic and social inequalities it fosters obliterate prospects for meaningful 
self-rule and political equality. 
Marks further deconstructs "low-intensity" approaches to the 
"democratic norm thesis" by analyzing its uses as ideology. For the purposes 
of her critique, Marks defines ideology as "ways in which meaning serves to 
establish and sustain relations of domination" (p. 1 0). Like other ideologies, 
"low-intensity democracy" employs a number of legitimization and 
dissimulation strategies to establish its authority. For instance, supporters of 
"low-intensity democracy" resort to rationalization, suggesting that since 
"low-intensity" democratization is the only measurable, attainable goal, it 
must likewise be the best. At the same time, the "democratic norm" masks 
inequalities of decision-making power through devices such as unification, the 
"imaginary resolution of social and political antagonisms" (p. 65), and 
simplification, "presenting social life in reductive terms ... [to hide] the 
unevenness and complexity of social processes" (p. 65). Similarly, reification 
of the term "democracy" and reliance on dichotomous reasoning (democratic 
vs. non-democratic) reduce the democratic ideal to a set of finite structural 
characteristics, while masking real political inequality among independent 
citizens. Such dissimulation strategies draw attention away from the 
fundamentally undemocratic realities at play in self-proclaimed democratic 
systems. Marks believes that this ideological conceptualization of democracy 
encourages policy-makers to approach democratization as a linear process in 
which the attainment of civil and political rights necessarily precedes and 
frustrates efforts to secure economic and social rights. Furthermore, this 
ideological screen masks the extent to which globalization reduces the power 
of national decision-makers over their citizenry by fostering dependence upon 
extra-national forces. 
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How might the "democratic norm" thesis be reformulated to overcome 
these ideological roadblocks and achieve more meaningful results? Marks 
believes that an important starting-place is the recognition that democracy is 
not merely an "institutional arrangement," but rather "an ongoing process of 
enhancing the possibilities for self-rule and the prospects for political equality, 
against a background of changing historical circumstances" (p. 59). In this 
conception, human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, and free elections are 
simply first steps towards democracy, not reliable indicators that democracy 
has been achieved. What is needed, Marks asserts, is not the recognition in 
international law of a democratic entitlement, but rather a "principle of 
democratic inclusion" (p. 1 09) that would "guide the elaboration, application, 
and invocation of international law" (p. 111 ). 
Marks concludes her critique by sketching out the possible impact of this 
proposed principle of democratic inclusion. Democratic inclusion, she 
suggests, would strive to transcend the arbitrary self-limitations of the 
democratic norm thesis. In other words, it would encourage policymakers to 
address the complex interrelationship between social and economic forces and 
political decision-making power. It would take into account the political 
implications of contemporary globalization by addressing the effect of 
transnational political forces on national political agendas. Attention to the 
political and economic hegemony of dominant groups in the international 
arena would prompt broader forms of international regulation and 
accountability. The principle of democratic inclusion would ground efforts 
towards democratization of global politics. 
Of course, Marks's deconstruction of the "norm of democratic 
governance" begs the question of whether her own reconceptualization of 
democracy might not also serve as ideology. Marks concedes that her 
"principle of democratic inclusion" is no less susceptible to being used for 
ideological purposes. She affirms, however, that the system of ideological 
critique employed in her book provides a lens through which to discern and 
thereby eliminate any ideology to which her own "principle of democratic 
inclusion" might be subjected in the future. Even granting the obvious validity 
of this observation, troubling questions persist about Marks's own work. If 
both the "democratic norm theory" and the "principle of democratic 
inclusion" may be made to serve ideology, why is one principle inherently 
superior to another? To what ideological end is Marks's thesis likely to be 
applied? Why would her ideology be preferable to ideology associated with 
the "democratic norm" thesis? 
Even more puzzling than Marks's refusal to engage such questions about 
future ideological application of her own proposal, however, is her inability to 
confront in a meaningful way the ideology that controls her own basic 
assumptions about democracy itself. Why, for example, is democracy 
desirable at all? Why is it desirable on an international or transnational scale? 
How does the movement for acceptance of democracy on an international 
level transcend neoimperialist ideology, particularly Marks's own book? 
Marks remains silent on these and many other troubling issues. Fortunately, 
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The Riddle of all Constitutions provides skeptics with an excellent critical 
paradigm for further interrogation of Marks's own unanswered questions. 
